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SECURING THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE



Objectives

- ⦿ Define third party software
 - What it is, why we use it
- ⦿ Define the risks from third party software
- ⦿ Identify tools and techniques for addressing the risk
- ⦿ Connect tools with the right situations
- ⦿ Explore one possible approach

Software Ecosystem



Software As a Service (SaaS)

Specify

Design

Build

Test

Operate

Support

Cloud

Also Known As: Software Supply Chain Risk



- Studied by Software Engineering Institute (SEI) and University of Maryland
- Who supplies code?
- Who supplies labour?
- Who operates software?

Kinds of “Third Parties”

1. Staff augmentation — they work on your premises, they follow your orders
2. Integrated Project Teams — they provide a team; you provide management
3. Contractual — You write contracts; they deliver
4. Service Provider — You buy what they sell



The Problem

- You can outsource activities,
but you cannot outsource liability**
- ⊙ Risk introduced by software
 - How do we identify it?
 - How do we quantify/qualify it?
 - ⊙ Various activities address that risk
 - How do we conduct those activities in someone else's lifecycle?
 - How do we hold the right people accountable?

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Risks from Software



- ⦿ Brand and reputation damage
- ⦿ Non-compliance
- ⦿ Failures in business logic
 - Lost sales
 - Unauthorised disclosure of data
 - Unavailability
- ⦿ Actual back doors or vulnerabilities

IANAL, But... (I am not a lawyer)



Popular Open Source Licenses

Possible Implications

- | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| ⦿ Apache | ⦿ Releasing source code |
| ⦿ “Artistic” License | ⦿ Permitting derivative works |
| ⦿ BSD | ⦿ Disclosing origin of software |
| ⦿ GNU General Public License | |
| ⦿ GNU “Lesser” GPL | |

<http://www.opensource.org/licenses>

Thinking About the Actors



Them

- ⦿ Do our vendors have a clue?
 - When designing
 - When coding
 - When operating
- ⦿ Do they do their jobs well?
- ⦿ Are their products suitable for us?

Us

- ⦿ Do we have a clue?
 - Requirements
 - Operations
 - Support
- ⦿ Are we doing our part well?
 - Integration
 - Compliance

Tools for the Problem



- ⦿ Assessing capabilities
- ⦿ Deliverable-based security gates
 - Security requirements
 - Security test plan
 - Threat model
 - Code Scan results w/ defect tracking
 - Security test results mapping to requirements
 - Penetration test results
- ⦿ Contract-based hooks

Build Security In Maturity Model – BSIMM



For Us

- ⦿ What do we do?
- ⦿ How mature are we?
- ⦿ Where might we put more effort?

For Vendors: vBSIMM


- ⦿ Quick / crude measure
- ⦿ 15 activities
- ⦿ Very low bar
- ⦿ Vendors still score poorly

<http://www.bsimm.com/>

Learning What Others Do



- ⦿ identify gates
- ⦿ unify regulations
- ⦿ know PII obligations
- ⦿ publish policy
- ⦿ awareness training
- ⦿ data classification
- ⦿ identify features
- ⦿ security standards
- ⦿ review security features
- ⦿ static analysis tool
- ⦿ QA boundary testing
- ⦿ external pen testers
- ⦿ good network security
- ⦿ incident response
- ⦿ close ops bugs loop



* ("everybody" = 20 out of 30 firms)

Alternatives to Consider




- ⦿ Microsoft SDL
- ⦿ OpenSAMM
- ⦿ CLASP
- ⦿ Etc.
- ⦿ Tend to be “prescriptive” not “descriptive”
- ⦿ Don’t help you measure yourself or others

Tools and Situations



- ⦿ We can often apply security requirements
 - Very applicable when we specify
 - Harder to enforce in SaaS—limited by vendor’s flexibility
- ⦿ Code scanning is very good evidence
 - Only works when you have code
 - Binary scanning is a poor substitute
- ⦿ Security testing always possible in UAT
- ⦿ Pen testing requires cooperation, often limited scope


Touchpoints for Third Party Development



Architecture Deliverables



- Architecture risk analysis
- Threat model
- Test strategy and test plan with security



Use the Source, Luke



- ⦿ Static analysis
- ⦿ Defect tracking
- ⦿ Patch management

- ⦿ OSS analysis
 - Identify accidental / unknown usage
 - Identify legal obligations

- ⦿ Static Analysis tools
 - Commercial
 - Fortify
 - Coverity
 - AppScan Source
 - Free
 - CppCheck
 - Findbugs

- ⦿ OSS Analysis
 - Black Duck
 - Palamida



Working with Binaries



- ⦿ Reverse engineering
 - Good for mobile, embedded, client/server
 - Not always permitted

- ⦿ Binary analysis
 - Veracode, etc.
 - Not always successful


- ⦿ Simulation
 - Run in VM, sandbox, or simulator

- ⦿ Observation
 - Eavesdropping
 - Proxying, etc.

Security Testing (Not Penetration Testing!)



- ⦿ Boundary cases
- ⦿ Negative cases
- ⦿ Inverted cases off the RBAC matrix
- ⦿ Identifying undesirable behaviour
- ⦿ Not “checking”
- ⦿ Not functional testing
- ⦿ Exploratory testing is good



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Penetration Testing



- ⦿ Require vendor support
 - access credentials
 - generous time windows
 - etc.
- ⦿ Require vendor tracking / reporting
 - What will they do?
 - When will they do it?
- ⦿ Focus on solutions, not problems
 - Not about finding max bugs
 - It's about fixing bugs



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Deployment



- ◎ Secure configuration
- ◎ Change control process
- ◎ Coordination with development team
- ◎ Upgrades to base platform
- ◎ Patch deployment to application

Operations



- ◎ Logging, monitoring SIEM
- ◎ Incident response
- ◎ Vulnerability tracking



Procurement



- ⦿ Security requirements during RFP / Tender process
- ⦿ Security questions during vendor selection
- ⦿ Periodic evaluation of vendor security capabilities
- ⦿ Security deliverables with functional deliverables

Procurement



- ⦿ Require source code
- ⦿ Permit decompiling / reverse engineering
- ⦿ Permit security testing
- ⦿ Require significant documentation
- ⦿ Escrow code if you must

One possible flow



- ⦿ Figure out which lifecycle stages are out of your control
- ⦿ Figure out which deliverables are feasible
- ⦿ Identify mechanisms to enforce deliverables (e.g., UAT, procurement, etc)
- ⦿ Require deliverables at appropriate stages
- ⦿ Add to PMO process, if possible

1: Identify Lifecycle Stages



- ⦿ Which ones are owned by vendors?
- ⦿ Where do your teams plug in?
 - PMO
 - Project leads
 - Procurement
 - Requirements
 - Integration
 - UAT

2: Identify Practical Deliverables



What?

- ⦿ What is practical, permissible, measurable?
 - Threat models
 - Code scan reports
 - Pen test reports
 - Defect reports
- ⦿ Is it objective?
- ⦿ How much visibility do you get into its creation?

When?

- ⦿ At major releases?
- ⦿ At regular intervals?
- ⦿ On-demand access?
- ⦿ As it is generated, or after it is reviewed by the vendor?

3: Promote Enforcement



Lifecycle Phases — Promotion

- ⦿ Create security gates
 - Dev → QA
 - QA → Staging
 - Staging → Production
- ⦿ Require security deliverables for promotion phase-to-phase
- ⦿ Enforce security sign-off

Be Pragmatic

- ⦿ If “security” always says ‘no’, then “security” becomes a *problem*
- ⦿ Problems get “fixed”
- ⦿ Choose battles carefully

4: Institutionalise



Put Security in the PMO

- ⦿ Make it regular
- ⦿ Make it understood
- ⦿ Automate as much as possible
 - Checklists
 - Worksheets
 - Processes

Change Takes Time

- ⦿ Start small
- ⦿ Minimise overhead
- ⦿ Make everything relevant
- ⦿ Ensure adoption of one small piece before introducing a new piece

Putting it Together



- ⦿ Identify your vendors and sources of third party software risk
- ⦿ Understand your competency and theirs
- ⦿ Determine ownership of lifecycle phases
- ⦿ Identify security deliverables for each phase
- ⦿ Gradually work them into your process



The best time to plant an
oak tree was twenty years ago.

The next best time is now.

—Ancient Proverb

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